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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3610 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KAREEM RUSSELL, 
a/k/a “REEM”, 
                                   Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 09-cr-672-03) 
District Judge:  Hon. Gene E.K. Pratter 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2012 
 
Before:   SCIRICA, FISHER, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 15, 2012) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Kareem Russell pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania to multiple offenses involving conspiracy, fraud, and identity 
theft.  Russell challenges the sentence he received, arguing that the District Court erred 
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when it denied him a minimal or minor role reduction pursuant to § 3B1.2 of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines, and further contending that the Court erred in holding him 
accountable for a financial loss caused by events beyond his participation in the 
conspiracy.  For the reasons that follow, the District Court was correct in denying 
Russell’s motion for a minimal or minor role reduction, but incorrect, on the evidence 
presented, in holding Russell accountable for the full loss of $825,831.  We will therefore 
vacate the sentencing order and remand for resentencing.  
I. Background 
 On October 15, 2009, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
returned an indictment against Russell and his co-defendants.  Later, on February 18, 
2010, a superseding indictment was filed charging Russell with one count of conspiracy 
to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(Count 1); two counts of bank fraud and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C 
§§ 1344, 2 (Counts 3 and 4); and two counts of aggravated identity theft and aiding and 
abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Counts 42 
and 43).  On June 13, 2011, Russell entered an open guilty plea to each of those counts.   
 The charges were based on a bank fraud and identity theft conspiracy headed by 
Russell’s co-defendant Miguel Bell.  Russell’s brother, Christopher Russell, also 
participated in the conspiracy.  Bell, Russell, his brother, and the other co-defendants 
illegally obtained bank account and personal information of bank customers from bank 
employees and an insurance company employee.  The defendants used that information 
to create false identification papers and fraudulent checks in the name of bank customers.  
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The defendants then recruited individuals, called “check runners,” to use the false 
identities to cash the fraudulent checks.  On the evidence presented at sentencing, Russell 
was responsible for recruiting two check runners, Priscilla Torres and Ralph Guy.  Guy, 
in turn, recruited his common-law wife, Jennie Hill.  At sentencing, the Government 
introduced, without objection, the testimony that Torres and Guy gave at Bell’s trial.  The 
Government concedes that it submitted no evidence that Russell knew about any 
additional check runners besides those he recruited, including Hill. 
The Probation Office submitted a pre-sentence report (“PSR”) in which it 
calculated the loss attributable to Russell from the conspiracy to be $825,831.1
                                              
 1 That loss figure was the combined total of “actual and attempted loss” that the 
Probation Office recommended and the District Court agreed should be attributed to 
Russell.  (See PSR ¶ 91.)  The actual loss attributed to him for restitution purposes was 
$702,510.  The total loss and attempted loss to the banks for the entire conspiracy was 
calculated by the Probation Office to be $2,492,339.   
  The PSR 
provided that the amount of that loss required a 14-level enhancement pursuant to 
Guidelines § 2B1.1(b)(1)(4).  The PSR also provided that Russell’s total offense level 
was 19 and his criminal history category was VI.  That, along with Russell’s convictions 
for aggravated identity theft, which carried a mandatory minimum 24-month and a 
maximum 48-month consecutive sentence, resulted in an effective Guidelines range of 87 
to 126 months.  Russell objected to that range.  He argued that he was entitled to a 
downward adjustment as a minimal or minor participant in the conspiracy, pursuant to 
Guidelines § 3B1.2.  He also argued that he should not be held accountable for $825,831 
of the loss.   
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After considering the testimony of Russell, Torres, and Guy, the District Court 
rejected both of Russell’s arguments.  It decided that Russell was more than a minimal or 
minor participant in the conspiracy, and that the loss of $825,831 was rightly attributable 
to him.  As a result, the Court sentenced Russell to 70 months’ imprisonment on each of 
Counts 3 and 4 and 60 months’ imprisonment on Count 1, to be served concurrently; 
consecutive to the 70 months, the Court sentenced Russell to concurrent 24 months’ 
imprisonment on each of Counts 42 and 43, for a total sentence of 94 months’ 
imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release, and restitution of $702,510.  
Russell filed this timely appeal. 
II. Discussion2
 Russell appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred in denying his 
motion for a minimal or minor role adjustment, and that it also erred in finding that the 
$825,831 loss was foreseeable for him and therefore attributable to him.  We address 
those arguments in turn. 
 
 A. Minimal or Minor Role Reduction 
The Guidelines provide that a defendant’s offense level may be reduced by four 
levels “[i]f the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity,” U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3B1.2(a), and by two levels “[i]f the 
                                              
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review of the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.  United States v. Kennedy, 
554 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review any factual findings that support a 
sentencing determination for clear error.  Id. 
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defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity.”  Id. § 3B1.2(b).  A “minimal 
participant” is one who “plays a minimal role in concerted activity.”  Id. cmt. n.4.  The 
Guidelines further explain that the minimal participant reduction “is intended to cover 
defendants who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a 
group.”  Id.  A “minor participant” is “a defendant ... who is less culpable than most other 
participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.”  Id. cmt. n.5.  The 
following factors are helpful in deciding whether a defendant’s role was minimal or 
minor: “the nature of the defendant’s relationship to other participants, the importance of 
the defendant’s actions to the success of the venture, and the defendant’s awareness of 
the nature and scope of the criminal enterprise.”  United States v. Rodriguez, 342 F.3d 
296, 299 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The District Court concluded that “it’s very hard to see in any meaningful way that 
what the Sentencing Commission had in mind when they describe a minor participant … 
fits Mr. Russell” (App. at 93-94), and rejected, without comment, the argument that 
Russell was a minimal participant.  Russell contends that was error because he only 
participated in the cashing of two checks, and that he was unaware of any of the other 
activities engaged in by his co-defendants.  He admits that he recruited Torres and Guy to 
cash fraudulent checks, but he states that he only recruited them to facilitate his own 
attempt to obtain money and not as part of a larger conspiracy.  He also explains that he 
was incarcerated for eight or nine months during the time of some of the fraudulent check 
cashing, from the end of 2005 to April 2007.  Given those facts, he says that he was not 
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an integral part of the check-cashing conspiracy and, as a result, should have been 
granted a minimal or minor role reduction.   
Unfortunately for Russell, however, his version of events is not entirely 
persuasive.  There was, in fact, much testimony from both Torres and Guy that 
contradicts Russell’s account.  Torres testified that Russell recruited her to pass 
fraudulent checks.  Russell and Bell took her to get identification card photos.  Russell 
escorted Torres on several occasions to banks to cash the checks.  And, importantly, after 
each run, Russell and Torres met with Bell and gave him the money.  Torres also testified 
that Russell recruited her to drive Bell to Indiana in February 2006 to cash checks.  
Christopher Russell, and “an older couple,” identified later to be Guy and Hill, also went 
on that trip.  (Supplemental App. at 6.)  After the Indiana trip ended with Hill being 
arrested, Russell took Torres out again in April 2006 to cash checks in Philadelphia.  
Russell then took Torres on a check-cashing run in New Jersey.  That run ended badly for 
Torres, when she was arrested at the bank in New Jersey.   
Guy also testified that Russell recruited him and took him to have his photograph 
taken for an identification card.  Russell then took him to Delaware in an attempt to cash 
checks.  Thereafter, Russell and his brother Christopher took Guy to Delaware again to 
cash checks.  Christopher Russell later introduced Guy to Bell, who took Guy on a 
successful check-cashing run.  Eventually, Guy and Russell met again, and Russell told 
Guy that Bell was interested in having Guy cash more checks.  Guy then engaged in 
several check-cashing efforts that were set up by Christopher Russell and Bell.  Guy 
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testified that he made many trips to several states in an attempt to cash checks.  He also 
testified that he traveled to Indiana with Torres and Bell.3
Faced with the conflicting testimony, the District Court appears to have credited 
Torres’s and Guy’s accounts of events more than Russell’s account and thus it 
determined that Russell’s role was neither minimal nor minor.  We discern no clear error 
in the District Court’s conclusion that Torres and Guy were more credible than Russell.  
See United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. City 
of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)) (“[W]hen the district court’s decision 
is based on testimony that is coherent and plausible, not internally inconsistent and not 
contradicted by external evidence, there can almost never be a finding of clear error.”).  
Nor was the Court wrong in deciding that Russell was not entitled to a minimal or minor 
role reduction.  He recruited both Torres and Guy, and, according to those two, he was 
actively involved in the conspiracy in the ways already described.  He thus deserved no 
downward adjustment as a minimal or minor participant. 
   
B. Enhancement for Loss Accountability 
Russell also appeals the District Court’s attribution to him of $825,831 of the loss.  
He argues that he was only responsible for $11,743, which is the total of the two checks 
listed in Counts 42 and 43, to which he pleaded guilty.  Any additional loss, Russell 
argues, is not attributable to him.  In the PSR, the Probation Office suggested the loss 
figure of $825,831, based upon checks presented using the false identities of all Citizens 
                                              
 3 Russell’s only response to the testimony of Torres and Guy is that they were 
lying.   
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Bank customers victimized during the period of Russell’s involvement with the 
conspiracy.  The District Court agreed and concluded that the loss of $825,831 was 
foreseeable because of Russell’s conduct.  
 Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines provides a specific offense-level enhancement 
based upon the economic loss caused by theft crimes.  Pertinent here, an offense level is 
increased by 14 levels for losses of more than $400,000 but less than $1,000,000.  See 
U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(H), (b)(1)(I).  In the case of conduct jointly undertaken, the loss 
will be attributed to a defendant for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of 
others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).4
                                              
 4 Under § 1B1.3, deciding whether a loss from a conspiracy can be attributable to 
a particular defendant requires district courts to consider whether the actions of co-
conspirators “(1) were in furtherance of the jointly-undertaken activity, (2) were within 
the scope of the defendant’s agreement, and (3) were reasonably foreseeable in 
connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to undertake.”  United States 
v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 732 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 
995 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2 (“Because a count may be 
worded broadly and include the conduct of many participants over a period of time, the 
scope of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant … is not necessarily the 
same as the scope of the entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily 
the same for every participant.”). 
  Yet, the loss attributable to a co-defendant is not necessarily 
coextensive with the breadth of the conspiracy.  The Guidelines require an individualized 
inquiry into whether the loss is attributable to a specific co-defendant.  See United States 
v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 995 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[A] searching and individualized inquiry 
into the circumstances surrounding each defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy is 
critical to ensure that the defendant’s sentence accurately reflects his or her role.”).   
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Here, Russell and the Government agree that the facts submitted at Russell’s 
sentencing do not support the loss figure of $825,831 adopted by the District Court.  
Instead, they both agree that Russell’s sentence must be vacated and this case remanded 
for resentencing.5
The Government notes that the loss figure of $825,831 accounts for all losses, 
actual and attempted, to Citizens Bank from November 2005 through March 2007 – the 
period that Russell participated in the conspiracy.  But, the Government also 
acknowledges that the evidence of Russell’s involvement in the conspiracy was more 
limited, involving the procuring of customer identities from a single Citizens Bank 
employee and recruiting two check runners to utilize that information.  There is, on the 
present record, no basis to conclude that he had any knowledge that his brother 
Christopher and Bell were procuring other identity information from other Citizen Bank 
employees.  (See Appellee’s Br. 30-31 (“The government did not present evidence that 
Kareem Russell had any association with any of the dozens of other runners who 
attempted to cash those additional checks, nor that Russell was aware that Miguel Bell 
and Christopher Russell were endeavoring to perpetrate a broader scheme.”).)  Thus, the 
Government concedes that, again on this record, the $825,831 loss cannot be entirely 
attributed to Russell because some of that loss was the result of Bell’s and Christopher 
Russell’s recruitment of other check runners, which there is no indication that Russell had 
any part of.  Much to its credit, the Government recognizes that Russell cannot rightly be 
   
                                              
 5 The Government explains that, on the evidence presented at sentencing, it can 
attribute, at best, $390,039 of the loss to Russell.  That amount is below the threshold of 
$400,000 that precipitated the 14-level enhancement in Russell’s sentencing range. 
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held accountable for criminal activity of which he was unaware and cannot fairly be said 
to have foreseen.  We accept the parties’ agreement that the evidence submitted at 
sentencing did not support attributing a loss of $825,831 to Russell.   
III. Conclusion 
 For the reasons noted, we will vacate Russell’s sentence and remand for 
resentencing consistent with this opinion.6
                                              
 6 With respect to resentencing, the parties argue at length about what evidence the 
District Court may consider and should consider, as well as whether Russell’s purported 
imprisonment during part of the conspiracy should affect the loss total.  We need not 
address those arguments here.  The District Court has discretion to allow additional 
evidence, and we will not in the first instance speculate on what that evidence might be.  
See United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 831-32 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that it is 
within district court’s discretion to permit further development of record on resentencing 
and that “district court is in a far better position than we to assess the situation in the light 
of the circumstances surrounding the original sentencing hearing”). 
 
